http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Oct/44
If I am reading this correctly, the Veeam Proxy software stores the local/domain admin account and password in its local (client being backed up) log files. The password a simple double base64 encrypted string. The log file is readable by Everyone, including local users all the way down to guest accounts.
Log locations
Windows Server 2003: %allusersprofile%\Application Data\Veeam\Backup
Windows Server 2008 and up: %programdata%\Veeam\Backup
This could mean that any server backed up using Veeam Proxy could contain the information, or it may just be located on the Veeam Proxy servers themselves.
Excerpt:
“The vulnerability allows a local Windows user, even with low privileges
as the ones provided to an anonymous IIS's virtualhost user, to access
Veeam Backup logfiles that include a double-base64 encoded version of
the password used by Veeam to run.
The affected component is VeeamVixProxy, created by default on
installation and the user must be a privileged Local Administrator or
a Domain Administrator.
For example the wizard for adding a VMware or Hyper-V Backup Proxy
explicitly state "Type in an account with local administrator privileges
on the server you are adding. Use DOMAIN\USER format for domain
accounts, or HOST\USER for local accounts.".
We conservatively refer to this issue as a Local Administrator Privilege
Escalation but the use of Domain Administrator accounts is not
discouraged, if not advised, and we saw this pattern in our customers
production infrastructures.
Has anyone dealt with this? Does veeam have any follow up on this at all?